




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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

THE CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY  
IN PLATO'S THOUGHT AND IN RECENT IDEALISM

by

Alice Dods  
(A. B., Boston University, 1933)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

1941

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- I. Introduction, Statement of the Problem . . . . . 1  
II. Plato's thoughts on the subject . . . . . 2

- A. Introductory  
1. Influence of Aristotle  
2. His background of metaphysics

- B. Conclusions about Plato

1. Plato as a philosopher  
2. Plato as a mathematician  
3. Plato as a metaphysician

- C. Summary and conclusions

- III. Appendixes  
A. Bibliography  
B. Index  
C. Glossary  
D. List of abbreviations  
E. List of symbols  
F. List of footnotes  
G. List of references  
H. List of sources  
I. List of dates  
J. List of names  
K. List of places  
L. List of things  
M. List of people  
N. List of events  
O. List of dates  
P. List of names  
Q. List of places  
R. List of things  
S. List of people  
T. List of events  
U. List of dates  
V. List of names  
W. List of places  
X. List of things  
Y. List of people  
Z. List of events

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction, Statement of the Problem . . . . .	1
II.	Plato's thoughts on the subjects . . . . .	3
	A. Introductory	
	1. Influence of Socrates	
	2. His background of metaphysics	
	B. Conclusions about Soul	
	1. Soul is simple	
	2. Soul is complex	
	3. Soul a self-moving system	
	C. Summary and definitions	
III.	Certain modern idealistic thinkers compared and contrasted . .14 with Plato.	
	A. Bowne	
	B. Royce	
	C. Laird	
	D. Brightman	
IV.	Summary and Conclusion . . . . .	.31
V.	Bibliography . . . . .	.35

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## SECTION ONE

The purpose of this thesis is to make, from the idealistic point of view, a critical comparison of the views concerning the nature of human personality of several recent idealistic thinkers with the views of Plato, and to re-examine the problem in the light of this comparison.

It is customary, in dealing with a problem of this scope, carefully to define and delimit, in order, insofar as is possible, to avoid confusion of terms. However, in the various writers studied in preparation for this thesis, each has his own distinct terminology. It will simplify matters, then, if after we discuss the findings of each man, we at that point determine in what sense he uses the words. Later, in Section Four, conclusions and summarizing definitions will be offered for the terms under discussion. It would be fruitless, for example, to ask what we mean by unity, as several definitions of the word are possible, and are found in the writings of the philosophers upon whose opinions we are turning the searchlight of our attention. Personality, too, is susceptible of many different interpretations.<sup>1</sup> We shall see what various writers have meant by the word and what synonyms they have used for it; and examine the evidence they adduce. This will be the material upon which definitions may be built, in the hope that the findings or beliefs of some idealistic thinkers may present an interesting contribution to the material available toward a rational answer to the question of the nature of human personality.

In the following section, the thoughts of Plato as the first critical student of the problem, will be discussed.

Then there will be attempted a comparison and contrast with Plato of certain modern thinkers who have dealt with the subject. Those whose

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1. It is often defined as a superficial or evanescent quality of the individual, something put on or developed, as an aid to personal or social success; this use of the term is never found in philosophy however.





ideas have been taken as material for this thesis are Bowne, Royce, and Laird; and last but not least, Dr. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, who has been the present writer's philosophy professor for nearly all her undergraduate and graduate work, and without whose help and inspiration she never would have found the way to be a seeker after the truth.

In the final section will be an explanation of conclusions about personality, and a brief summary of all points elaborated in preceding sections. At the very end will be found the Bibliography, which contains the sources from which material has been taken.





## SECTION TWO

Plato, which is the name by which we know the first thinker who, with his teacher Socrates, really considered our problem synoptically, seems, according to the best available evidence, to have been born about 427 B. C. of well-to-do Athenian parents. They gave him the best education possible to obtain, and he had sufficient means so that he could employ his time as he wished. His mind seems always to have been active and to have ranged widely over all fields. But philosophic material at that period was rather meagre. One or two of his predecessors had left a few vague impressions of their ideas of how the world became what they believed it to be, and of whether knowledge was possible; and some of the early Oriental religions had left fragments; but in the main Plato had to work these theories out for himself, and study critically what he found through his own experience and serious thought.

While still a young man Plato came in contact with Socrates, and his particular character and method have had a large influence on Plato. The work of these two men is inextricably woven into the pattern of Plato's dialogues, and we obtain by far the greater part of our ideas of the master through the eyes of his most famous pupil. The "higher criticism" of the text, to determine which ideas were those of Socrates and which of Plato, is entirely outside the scope of this thesis, and irrelevant to its problem. No attempt will be made here to distinguish the thoughts of Plato from those of his teacher, but all ideas presented in the Dialogues with Plato's apparent approval will be attributed to him. In deference to the difficulties experienced by critics who have made a lifelong study of the question of authorship, the ideas of both will be called Platonic.

Socrates' method of seeking truth was that of drawing out in conversation with people, their ideas, he himself professing ignorance; and





this was developed by Plato into the artistic style of the dialogue, which had the added advantage of recording each level of thought as he advanced to it. He was seeking always for a sound explanation of the universe; failing this, he would make definitions of abstract, ideal qualities with a view to going on from there to a tenable hypothesis of the nature of life and the soul. This method led his hearers toward a valid metaphysics.

While we are not concerned here with all the Platonic system, (if such it may be called), in order to understand his view of the soul, we must have something of his background of metaphysics.

He thought first about the universe as we know it. How did it come to be in the form in which we find it? Was it always existing, uncaused? If not, what caused it? In the Timaeus we find the myth of the creation clearly expounded. In Plato's view the first thing a philosopher had to do was to show what, in his opinion, was the cause of the world. He attempts a thoroughgoing teleological explanation of the universe. To do this he makes a distinction between cause proper (final cause), and auxiliary cause (the necessary physical conditions, or the environment); also between the use of Intelligence and Necessity in creating the world out of chaos. He finds an intrinsic incorrigible element always in the world, which he goes on to describe in detail later; this militates against perfection. He also finds a distinction between Being and Becoming, the changing and the changeless, the ideal and the phenomenal. The universe belongs, of course, to the latter class.

This universe was created by the Demi-urge, who really systematized and ordered what He found in the pre-existing Chaos. At a certain stage He hands the universe over to His creature gods, and retires into solitude,





except for certain operations requiring purpose, which He alone can administer. The Demi-urge is the embodiment of the Good, and the source of all knowledge and all existence, but not identical with it. He uses it. He is an Intelligence, whereas Ideas are objects of Intelligence.

The primary object of the Demi-urge is to construct the World-Soul, to cause it to come into existence. This means<sup>1</sup> that mechanical causation is not enough to account for the world.<sup>1</sup> We must have a primary cause of motion. (This is explained clearly in Phaedrus.)<sup>2</sup> This principle, or primary cause is the psyche, the Demi-urge--ultimately God, who is the energy of creation. The World-Soul, creation of the Demi-urge is said to be:

a. Composed of three elements--sameness, otherness, and being, (both changeless and changing, indivisible and divisible.) Each portion, of which there are a mathematically chosen number, contains the same proportion of Some, Other, and Being, welded indissolubly. The Soul is older and better than Body.<sup>(3)</sup> It stretches throughout the whole of the Body, and envelopes the exterior also. It is built into the Body, united centre to centre, and then begins its own peculiar motion to make unceasing intelligent life for all time.<sup>(4)</sup> It is invisible, while the body is visible. God gave the World-Soul Time, a movable image of eternity.<sup>(5)</sup>

b. Constructed to combine one part of Some to seven of Other.

c. An explanation of heavenly bodies--the spherical soul is the most perfect and complete form.

d. Motion-introducing. There are many different kinds of motion in the Soul, and it can move other things besides itself.

This was, of course, the World-Soul, from which the gods were created. They were immortal. But according to the Plan, contemplated by the Demi-urge, there were to be other kinds of creatures too, who should be mortal, although possessing Soul. If the Demi-urge created those Himself, as He might very well have done, they they would have been equal to the gods. So He gave the power to fashion bodies to the lesser gods while He would

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1 POP 4

2 Sec. 245e

3 Timaeus 34c & ff

4 Timaeus 36e & ff

5 Timaeus 37e





sow Soul, and give it to the gods at the proper time.<sup>6</sup> This Soul-Mixture He made less pure than that of the gods, and divided into portions equal in number to the stars. He showed these new souls the universe and the laws of destiny. He told them that Necessity compels them to be implanted in bodies sometime. This confinement would give them sensation, desire, and other emotions. If the soul masters these, it will live justly; if not, unjustly. Then he sowed them in the organs of Time and told the young gods to go ahead making bodies for the souls. Theirs was to be the responsibility for governing well these mortal creatures.<sup>7</sup>

Bodies were made by the gods out of fire, earth, water and air, and fastened "with numerous pegs, invisible for smallness."<sup>8</sup> Within these bodies they bound the immortal souls. The head, the top, is spherical, the most divine part, the seat of the immortal soul; the rest of the body is to be its servant. The bodily conditions are part of the auxiliary causes spoken of above,<sup>9</sup> in contradistinction to the first or final cause.

It is important that we note here the relationship of Reason to the Soul. It seems to be Plato's final considered opinion that Reason is the one part of the human soul which might be said to have the power to function separately from the rest. However, it never actually becomes separate.<sup>10</sup> The mythical form of the explanation makes the cleavage more clear-cut than Plato means it to be.

We might say that for Plato the part of man he called soul is the part which is divine, most like God. However, in accepting this definition we must remember that Plato is here speaking of the immortal part of the soul, the Reason. This is the moral side of man, which is constantly trying, or should try, to do right, and listen to the voice of God. One must constantly strive to make himself as good as possible, then he will have nothing to fear. A person's mind his (immortal) soul, his reason, is the most important.

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6. Timaeus, Sec. 41 b & c.

7 Timaeus, Sec. 42





thing about his personality. The logic of this is that through the mind one perceives the eternal ideas, therefore the mind is the immortal part of man. The only way a person can be convinced of anything is through his mind, by reference to his recollection of these eternal ideas of which he knew before he was born. The body is a sort of prison-house for the mind,<sup>13</sup> although Plato admits he does not altogether understand this. The mind or soul dwells in this prison of the body, as we have seen. Plato also compares the body to an oyster-shell.

Going back to our original account of the universe, besides the Model, Plan or Pattern, which is intelligible and pre-existent, and the Copy, or the World-Soul, a Creature, we find still a third Form, the Receptacle. This is a very elusive conception which Plato discusses only in the Timaeus, where he calls it "the nurse of all Becoming,"<sup>14</sup> which is really not much help in defining it. But Plato finds a need for such a notion in the fact that elements change from one to another.<sup>15</sup> The Receptacle receives all forms and can become anything. It never changes its quality, although it appears different at different times.<sup>16</sup> Devoid of all form itself,<sup>17</sup> it yet in some way is possess<sup>ed</sup> of Intelligence.<sup>18</sup> The Receptacle brings together<sup>19</sup> the similar and separates the dissimilar.

Being is an object of thought, Becoming of opinion. Thought, or Reason, and opinion are two different faculties and deal with two different classes of objects. Reason deals only with Forms, or Ideas, Being. On the other hand Becoming is something we can only have opinions about, --an object of sense, for in-

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13 Phaedo, Sec. 62

14 Timaeus, 49a & ff

15 Timaeus, 49d

16 Timaeus, 49c

17 Timaeus, 50d

18 Timaeus, 51b

19 Timaeus, 53a





stance. Only gods and a very few men have Reason.<sup>20</sup>

The Reason is part of the immortal soul, as we have said. The mortal part includes the passions,<sup>21</sup> and is fastened in the chest. It is subject to appetite for food and drink,<sup>22</sup> and in general partakes more of the nature of the body. These parts are located in the chest and the abdomen and are attached to the body by bonds connected to the bone-marrow<sup>23</sup> which is the ground-stuff from which the mortal part of the soul develops. From its bonds of the immortal or whole Soul were cast out, and the body built around.<sup>24</sup> The bones that have most soul have least flesh, and vice-versa.<sup>25</sup> There is also a third kind of Soul<sup>26</sup> for sensation, a placid, vegetable type of soul which has no movement.

The Body, as we have seen, is a composition of the four elements, Earth, Fire, Air, and Water. Disease results from an excess or deficiency of any one of the four.<sup>27</sup> Folly is a disease of the soul<sup>28</sup> which is due to some condition of the body. The best prevention or cure of disease is to exercise soul and body together,<sup>29</sup> to imitate the perfect form of the Universe.

To summarize his view of creation, then, God, the Cause, according to Pattern creates in the Receptacle (which is primordial chaos or givenness.) The union of the Forms in the Receptacle is transient,<sup>30</sup> a flux. (This suggests modern physics.) The world points in these three directions, to God, to the Pattern and to the Receptacle. Add to this the creature thus made, and you have the four kinds of Being.<sup>31</sup> The creature is a "world of passage," the creative factors, including the Receptacle, are unchanging.<sup>32</sup> The relation of God to this created, concrete world is one of cause and effect,<sup>33</sup> as it is a copy of being, an imitation of God.<sup>34</sup> The world is a

20 Timaeus, 52 e

21 Timaeus, 69 d

22 Timaeus, 70 e

23 Timaeus, 73 b

24 Timaeus, 73 e

25 Timaeus, Sec. 75 e

26 Timaeus, Sec. 77 b & c

27 Timaeus, Sec. 82 a

28 Timaeus, Sec. 86 b

29 Plato, Timaeus, Sec. 88 c

30 Demos, POP, 5

31 Plato, Timaeus, 48 e

32 Plato, Timaeus, 50 b

33 Demos, POP, 6

34 Plato, Timaeus, 29





systematic unity, then, since it is a copy of the ideal.<sup>35</sup> "Our view declares the Universe to be essentially one."<sup>36</sup>

Long before ~~Plato~~<sup>he</sup> came to the conclusion (discussed in the *Timaeus*) that the Universe is one, Plato had undertaken a psychological and philosophical analysis of the human soul. This is largely found in the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*, where he is discussing death and immortality, and rhetoric, respectively. Soul appears as an integration of all the spiritual factors, and might be termed an expression of God. In *Phaedrus*<sup>37</sup> it is referred to as self-moving motion. It moves other things besides itself, and so can be defined as activity and becoming, or the principle of transition--the substitution of something new for what is gone--perpetual perishing, perpetual renewal. The soul is immortal because one of its elements is Being, which is eternal; it is self-restoring and self-reproducing by the constant generation of life--the principle of the soul--from death.<sup>38</sup> (Opposites are generated from opposites.) It is the seat of all activity in nature. This activity follows a planned pattern for the achievement of value by reason.

The soul knows things, through reason, but the body is the vehicle of the soul for finding and expressing this knowledge. To explain this, Plato decides that, while being a unity, the soul is to a certain extent homogeneous with the body; that is all body contains something of the soul, and all soul something of the body. This view reminds one of the theological view of some people today, that Christ was human as we are, but in a lesser degree; and we are divine as He was, but in a lesser degree. This means that Soul is a mixture of material and immaterial; this is a very confused thought, and undoubtedly occurred because Plato's scientific knowledge had not kept pace with the range of his speculation

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35 Demos, POP, 6

36 Demos, POP, 7

37 Plato, *Timaeus*, 55d

38 Plato, *Phaedrus*, Sec, 245





about the soul. He had no clear idea of the nature of matter; but it seems reasonable to suppose that, given the facts known today by modern science, he would have been an idealist. But as it was he had not found any one factor to which all the universe is reducible, so the Soul conception is not clear.

For Plato, the soul is composed of Reason, Spirit, and Desire--the "tri-partite" Soul of the Phaedrus,<sup>40</sup> where the soul is described as two winged horses and a charioteer; a one in a many, simple and yet complex. It is important that there are two winged horses, driven by the charioteer, whose name is Reason. Reason has to drive the two horses and make them co-operate. It is often very difficult, for while one of the horses, Spirit, is well-bred and follows commands, Desire is very unruly, so that they pull in opposite directions, and Reason has a great deal of trouble to reach his destination. The soul is thus seen to be complex; it is not compound, because while all parts of the soul have different functions, they are all composed of one indivisible stuff. No part of it can be separated from the whole without ceasing to exist. Plato's reasons for believing this we shall discuss later.<sup>41</sup>

In the Republic, Plato seems to find the soul far from being a unity. However, the word complex explains the conflict often found within the soul. This is due, Plato finds, to several things, such as ignorance, strife, failure to recollect. But the same soul possesses the power of knowledge of and desire for union with the Good, or God. Instruction brings back this knowledge, out of the "limbo of forgotten things." The soul has, then, two problems. First, to recall the forgotten; and second, to preserve what has been recalled.

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39 Plato, Philebus, Sec. 25a

40 Sec. 253

41 See page 11





The body is akin to the concrete, the visible, which is always different, that is, always changing; the soul, on the other hand, finds kinship with the abstract, which is changeless wisdom. No soul is to any less extent a soul than any other, although some are more divine than others. It is more often than not at odds with its body, although it causes the body to be alive when taken possession of by the soul. The philosopher cares little for anything that has to do with the body, but turns toward the things of the soul. Nothing about the body is an end in itself. Through freeing himself from the demands of the body--practicing dying--and so becoming<sup>in</sup> pure, reality or truth becomes clear for the philosopher. No exact knowledge ever comes through sensation, only from thought.

The method by which the soul may act on the body to use for its own ends is by being continuous with it. The soul can mix with the body because it is in itself a mixture. It inheres in body, and uses it as mediator or vehicle.<sup>42</sup> The mortal soul acts as one with the body, for sense-impressions. For judging and commanding,<sup>43</sup> the soul is independent. This question must have been a vital one for Plato. He finally arrived at the conclusion, mentioned above (see page 9) that the soul is homogeneous with the body.<sup>44</sup> Both are mixtures. The soul is composed of both Form and Body, as the body is. The difference is one of degree, not one of kind. The soul is more integrated than the body. Both are motions, with transitions from one to the other.<sup>45</sup> The soul supplies the link between Form and Body, and is a real entity. Both Soul and Body are creatures, but the Soul is also a creative factor.

As was mentioned earlier,<sup>46</sup> Plato feels that no part of the mind can be separated in a physical sense from any other part without ceasing to exist.<sup>47</sup> There are two reasons for this. The first is that the mind is not physical, and the second that it is an indivisible entity. No part

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42 Plato, Timaeus, Sec. 87 a

43 Plato, Timaeus, Sec. 88

44 Plato, Timaeus, Sec. 89

45 Plato, Laws, Sec. 894 a

46 See page 10

47 Plato, Timaeus, Sec. 94





of it can exist anywhere other than with the complete mind of the individual to whom it belongs. Every part of a person's mind exists in his mind, and nowhere else. Mind is an indivisible unity, a whole, no matter how complex it may be.

He would doubtless have explained the phenomenon of multiple personality, had it been brought to his attention, in one of two ways. First, he might have considered it to be possession by a god or demon.<sup>48</sup> Or he might, in more modern language, explain it somewhat as follows: a body, previously accompanied by one personality, may suddenly appear to be accompanied by more than one. These personalities stand in loose causal relationship to each other. They are not actual subdivisions of the original, and can usually be reintegrated.

The unity of the soul, for Plato, is expressed by its interest in thinking. Wherever there is a mind, there is unity of reason; the latter cannot function, however, unless soul, the personality, is a complete conscious unity. The essential principle of unity, wherever it be found, is the unity of personality.<sup>49</sup> The impulse of the soul to integrate itself is another expression of its unity. Only in the Soul, says Plato, can one find the roots of unity and permanence, unchanging in change. Life is the indefatigable pursuit of perfection in all things, which is true unity. Plato has much to say about the question of how the incarnate soul strives to re-achieve its pristine perfection, of how to be out of the body while in it.<sup>50</sup> This the philosopher must constantly strive to do, to attain the perfection of the Idea of the Good, which is value in general. This desire for the good is common to all rational beings,<sup>51</sup> and so might

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48 Plato, Apology, Sec. 31d

49 Plato, Phaedo, Sec. 79

50 Plato, Phaedo, Sec. 80e

51 Demos, POP, 51





be called another expression of the unity of the soul, which is caused by God.<sup>52</sup>

In summarizing Plato's views, we find three main ideas in regard to personality, which he everywhere calls the soul:

1. The soul is simple, that is, indivisible. (Phaedo)
2. The soul is complex, but unified. (Phaedrus)
3. The soul is a self-moving system with central control.  
(Phaedo, Phaedrus, and others.)

We may now hazard some definitions as to Plato's use of terms. The soul is, of course, the word he uses for the spiritual part of man. By this word, Plato also means all facts and phases of motion. It has two parts, mortal and immortal, but both have creative factors. It must have unity and identity to exist at all, as it is activity. It is also the bond which unites the creator with the creatures which are devoid of creative powers. He finds soul a complete, conscious unity, striving for spiritual ends.

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52 Demos, POP, 97





### SECTION THREE

Plato was the first philosopher definitely to consider critically the problem of the unity of human personality. Hence he has received a somewhat extended treatment here. But he was far from being the last. All through the history of philosophy thinkers have tried to find a reasonable, satisfactory answer<sup>1</sup> to the question, far too many of them to incorporate all the views here, or even to mention the names of most of them. The work of only a few typical modern idealists who have specialized in this field, have been considered in the preparation of this thesis. The unity of personality has long been a problem of psychology as well, but we are here concerned only with the philosophical aspects of the question.

The first of these twentieth-century thinkers whose views are being discussed in detail for the purposes of this paper, is Borden Parker Bowne, a personalistic idealist. In his Introduction to Psychological Theory, the very first chapter takes up the self, and its relation to life as a whole.<sup>1</sup> In mental experience, says Bowne, the self is the subject of the mental state, and no mental experience is possible without a self to undergo that experience.<sup>2</sup> The mental subject, the self, is active and abiding. In fact, it is the only entity Bowne finds for tying experiences together.

As for Plato, so for Bowne, to understand his thought about the self, it is necessary, while not going deeply into it, to have some slight picture of the background of his metaphysics. The system of thought which is so peculiarly Bowne's, is known today as personalistic idealism.

A brief discussion of personalism in general is found in Frank W. Collier's foreword to Bowne's Personalism. Mr. Collier says personalism is grounded in human experience, common to us all. We are all aware of some

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1 Bowne, IPT, 11

2 Bowne, IPT, 13





self-knowledge and self-direction,<sup>3</sup> the two attributes of a person. For personalism, one of whose co-founders in the United States Bowne was, says that the Ultimate Reality, the First Cause, is a personal being, the Infinite Person.<sup>4</sup> The Infinite Person is a divine being; finite persons are human beings, limited in their activities and scope, and dependent, although other than, the Infinite Person. The goal of imperfect human personality, then starts with our universal human experience.

This is, of course, a theistic point of view. In an earlier book,<sup>6</sup> Bowne tells us what he means by that term. The theist is convinced that the problem of the world and life cannot be solved without God; and the actual world-order, including man, can only be understood as the outcome of design. This is, of course, a matter not for demonstration, but for rational probability. Under this metaphysic, the nature of reality appears not as a matter of perception, but one solely of inference from the phenomena.<sup>7</sup> Nature is the manifestation of a spiritual power working under the forms of space and time.<sup>8</sup> We are forced to go behind the phenomena to explain them.

At this point we are rather more interested in the origin and nature of the human personality, in Bowne's view. All theism must teach the immanency of God. Selfhood and freedom distinguish the finite soul, for whose origin he claims no pre-existence before birth. A special creation of the Soul is made in connection with the organism to which it belongs. Yet, after this "special creation," he says, "the conception of a unitary and abiding soul is the only one which is not hopelessly shattered by the most patent facts of consciousness."

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3 Bowne, PER, v  
 4 Bowne, PER, v  
 5 Bowne, PER, v  
 6 Bowne, THE, 4  
 7 Bowne, THE, 6

8 Bowne, THE, 7  
 9 Bowne, IPT, 36





True man is the soul which is also the mind when it is engaged in intellectual activities.<sup>10</sup> He defines personal thinking as any mental activity of which we are aware.<sup>11</sup>

Bowne looks for a starting point which everyone can accept,<sup>12</sup> and finds it in these three axioms, unprovable,<sup>13</sup> but not open to question:<sup>14</sup>

1. Co-existence of persons.<sup>15</sup>
2. Law of reason valid and binding for all.<sup>16</sup>
3. World of common experience. (17)

Before anyone can do any thinking about the Supreme Person or the Universe or his own personality, he must accept these three points without proof. There can be no differences of opinion among philosophers in regard to these.<sup>18</sup> There can be only differences in interpretations, or reasons for conclusions. Then we can go on to find a conception of life and the world which will be compatible with the high faiths of humanity.<sup>19</sup> "If we include God and immortality we annul materialism, which for Bowne is atheism," Mr. Collier points out.<sup>20</sup>

We are, says Bowne, in a personal world from the start.<sup>21</sup> Idealistic systems use personal experience, but transcend it, and draw interpretations from it.<sup>22</sup> We need philosophy because we are impelled to go beyond our experience for its explanation and understanding.<sup>23</sup> Everyone has some sort of philosophy,<sup>24</sup> for it is simply his way of looking at things.<sup>25</sup>

In other words, we must transcend "common sense." Common sense tells us that things "hang together in certain ways,"<sup>26</sup> and these ways can be studied.<sup>27</sup> That is science, through which we learn to control our inner and outer world. We do, however, need philosophy also, because through it we come to understand reasons why things are as they are. All we have to start with,

10 Bowne, IPT, 36  
 11 Bowne, PER, 15  
 12 Bowne, PER, vii  
 13 Bowne, PER, 15  
 14 Bowne, PER, 22  
 15 Bowne, PER, 23  
 16 Bowne, PER, 20  
 17 Bowne, PER, 21  
 18 Bowne, PER, 23  
 19 Bowne, PER, 7

20 Bowne, PER, v  
 21 Bowne, PER, 25  
 22 Bowne, PER, 26  
 23 Bowne, PER, 28-9  
 24 Bowne, PER, 32  
 25 Bowne, PER, 5  
 26 Bowne, PER, x  
 27 Bowne, PER, 36





is, it is true, our experience. But the names and explanations, while they do not change that experience, help us the better to understand it and the better to be prepared for the next one. The only duty of philosophy, Bowne feels, is to help us interpret the personal world.<sup>28</sup>

What is the personal world, and how can we know it? The early thinkers, before Kant, held two views. The first was that knowledge came only from experience, without which the mind was a mere tabula rasa. The other was that mind knew things independently, without experience.<sup>29</sup> But, says Bowne, both these views are superficial. Before we ask how knowledge is possible, we must first discover how experience is possible. Kant said it was actively constructed from within by the mind.<sup>30</sup> The activity of mind has its own immanent laws, some of which are the principles involved in the process of knowing. Knowledge requires activity,<sup>31</sup> and implies being or content,<sup>32</sup> something to know. Experience which comes through the senses is not only the impression on the individual, but is also a symbol of the world outside.<sup>33</sup> Now we are ready to ask the question, "How can we know that world?"

Knowledge Bowne defines as a certainty that our conception corresponds to reality or truth. Our minds do not make this truth; they only recognize it. When the untruth of an idea is impossible we call the insight of the mind knowledge. We know a thing only through phenomena, but we interpret these in our own personal terms. Knowledge depends on the nature of both subject and object. The subject must be active.<sup>34</sup> The meaning of anything is furnished by the mind. All permanency and identity are the result of thought<sup>35</sup> as sensations are discontinuous.

The living self is invisible,<sup>36</sup> known only through deeds. It is

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28 Bowne, PER, 53

29 Bowne, PER, 54

30 Bowne, PER, 55

31 Bowne, PER, 59

32 Bowne, PER, 60

32 Bowne, PER, 61

33 Bowne, PER, 61

34 Bowne, PER, 66

36 Bowne, PER, 68





"as formless and invisible as God himself." Out of the invisible comes the meaning of everything in terms of personality; this means a self-conscious intelligence in the physical form of a body.

This body is only one phase of the external, material world, of whose reality we want to be sure. Our minds cannot give us this assurance.<sup>37</sup> The only way we could tell anything for sure would be if there were "a mind at both ends of the process."<sup>38</sup> In other words, the universe must be mental too, or we can have no understanding of it, no comprehension of what our senses bring to us.

For Bowne, the "Self is the mental subject knowing and experiencing itself as living, and as one."<sup>39</sup> Things exist only in and for intelligence.<sup>40</sup> They have no extra-mental existence, though they may have an extra-human, in minds other than those of full-fledged persons, God or sub-humans.

The only unity Bowne finds anywhere is in the conscious self.<sup>41</sup> The unity of the thinking subject is a condition of consciousness. Memory is impossible without an abiding I. Comparison and relation demand unity also, as does the power of action. Identity also is found only in consciousness.<sup>42</sup> The unitary mental subject, he finds, is needed for thought, consciousness and memory.<sup>43</sup>

But the unity and completeness of the mind does not, for Bowne, mean the same for personality. Neither is personality dependent on the body. Personality is self-knowledge and self-control.<sup>44</sup> Perfection or completeness is possible only in the Infinite or Absolute. We think we know independence in self-hood but it is only partial.<sup>45</sup> Our independence is limited self-control. We unite both independence and dependence in our finite personalities, which are other than the Divine.

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\* 37 Bowne, PER, 73  
 38 Bowne, PER, 76  
 39 Bowne, PER, 88  
 40 Bowne, PER, 94  
 41 Bowne, PER, 103

42 Bowne, MET, 97  
 43 Bowne, MET, 362  
 44 Bowne, THE, 168  
 45 Bowne, PER, 281





than the Divine.

So for Bowne we may say that, while personality is not unified, self or consciousness is; this means unity in the strictest sense of identity and continuity. The soul is distinct from body, and can live apart from it, but never independent of the Supreme Person. We have now a clearer understanding of Bowne's use of terms, which are not identical with Plato's even when he uses the same word. For instance, for Plato the word philosophy has its literal meaning, a love of wisdom. For him a philosopher is a seeker after truth. But for Bowne it is also a person's way of looking at things. The only duty it has is to help us interpret the personal world, which for him is all the world there is.

First Cause for them both is God; but their definitions of it would vary widely. First Cause, for Bowne, is the Infinite Person, a divine being who is the omnipresent ground of all finite experience and activity. He is ever-living, ever-present, ever-working. The Supreme Reason and Will, the form and product of whose activity is the universe. For Plato God is likewise activity, uncaused motion. He is pure spirit, pure intelligence for both and for both He is other than the universe. But the distinction between their conceptions of God lies in the fact that for Plato, the Demi-urge finished his work and retired from the scene, except for a few special occasions when His divine presence was needed, and left the operation of the world, and the problems of mankind, to the lesser gods. He is said to have loved the world, but was not close spiritually or available to His creatures. Bowne's God is immanent, and no finite person can ever become completely independent of Him.

The Soul for Plato, as we have seen, is like God in the sense of being self-moving motion. Some of its activities are knowing and creating, and it is also like God in that sense. But for him it is always slightly





mixed, in the finite version at least, with something of the body, even though it is a unity in the sense of having identity and continuity. It is the channel through which God transmits His activity. The human soul has a mortal part which is not so divine, but they work together under the guidance of Reason, which is the pilot of the soul. The mortal part is part of the immortal but is more open to the influence of the body. For Bowne the soul or self is the mental subject, knowing and experiencing. It is living, and completely unified. True man is the soul. But Bowne also recognizes a personality, of which the soul is a part. Neither is dependent on the body, however. Personality is self-knowledge and self-control, never perfect in a finite individual, who strives for this perfection, found in God. Self or consciousness is completely unified, in the strictest sense of identity and continuity, although personality is not. Bowne accepts, of course, the world of natural law, about which Plato could know nothing, as the basis and groundwork of his metaphysics. Plato had to figure out explanations for every thing which would fit the facts as he knew them. He built a system with which later thinkers had to reckon, whether they accepted it or not.

Another modern philosopher who has shown an unusual amount of interest in the problem of personality is Josiah Royce. But before going into his specific doctrine of the self, let us digress to determine his general philosophical position. In an early book<sup>46</sup> he calls his doctrine an individual, modified form of Post-Kantian Idealism. He believes first and foremost that all reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought<sup>47</sup> This means that there is no such thing as "dead matter" anywhere in the world. Everything is an expression of spirit. Reality is such because true

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46 Royce, RAP, ix

47 Royce, RAP, 433





judgments can be made about it, and also false ones. But all judgments are present to the Infinite, good and bad. He knows what we have and what we lack. All things are for thought by the Ideal Judge.<sup>48</sup> The world, as a whole must be absolutely good as the Infinite is perfect. God is the omnipotent Ruler of things, so must be identical with His creation. He is also a self-conscious individual, ultimately real. We are all parts of Him, one persisting through the many. Individuality is known by and in the unity of consciousness. As the Absolute is real, so is every finite moral individual, insofar as the moral order will allow him to be. This makes him unique, in a sense free to make his own choices and to be himself. But he must have an ideal, a purpose, or he would not be a person at all. "The goal assures the unity."<sup>49</sup>

This self-consciousness of finite individuals is also a contrast effect, ego against others, out of which self begins to emerge to give continuity to the self-consciousness. The knowledge of one's self as seeker lets him contrast himself with the rest of the world.<sup>50</sup> One's real self is his consciousness when viewed as having unity of meaning and as exemplifying an ideal.

Our individual experience is part of God's experience, identical with it,<sup>51</sup> and God would not be complete without us.<sup>52</sup> The complete fulfilment of our purposes, our experience, is oneness with God. We are selves because we have a place in His world, and our finite purposes must be to the end of oneness with Him. For the Absolute all life is individual but only as it expresses a meaning, or is unified by a plan.

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48 Royce, RAP, 535 & ff

49 Royce, COG, 258

50 Royce, COG, 286

51 Royce, COG, 287

52 Royce, COG, 287-8





There are, then, for Royce, two selves, the Absolute and the finite. The finite self is the mind, the conscious experience of an individual; the Absolute Self is all the universe in its wholeness of purpose. It is God, within Whom every finite self takes its place.

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There are three conceptions of the individual self. The empirical basis for knowledge of the self is a certain class of experience; but in order to understand that experience we must go beyond the observable facts.

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"The self of our inner and outer life preserves a genuine, although to us hidden unity." "The Ego is defined as the totality of inner and outer experience of any of the rest of mankind. Life presents itself as a series of contrasts between the two, giving us unity and variety. But never do I observe myself as any single and unambiguous fact of consciousness." (55)

The second conception of Ego is the realistic--that Self is a distinct entity. It preserves its unity through chaos because in itself it is one. Royce does not agree with this. He says, "Whatever the Self is, it is not a Thing." The real self for him is like any other real fact, a conscious meaning within the unity of the "Absolute Life."

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The third conception is strictly idealistic, and is the one Royce prefers. It is an ethical conception. "The true individual self. . . gets its final expression in some form of consciousness different from any we now possess," by which he means, of course, its perfection in the Absolute. "The Self is just your own present imperfectly expressed pulsation of meaning and purpose." This self can be contrasted with one's own past or future self quite as well as with the self of another, or with life as a whole, or society as a whole, or even with God. The unity of the self can also be expressed as the temporal whole of life, which ought to be contrasted with all the rest of life.

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53 Royce, WI, 258 & ff.

54 Royce, WI, 258

55 Royce, WI, 264

56 Royce, IPT, 265

57 Royce, IPT, 274

58 Royce, IPT, 266

59 Royce, IPT, 267

60 Royce, IPT, 268





Here self is an Ethical Category.<sup>61</sup> "By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with them--by this, and not by the possession of any Soul-Substance, I am defined and created a Self."<sup>62</sup> These are what Royce calls his only "genuine terms"<sup>63</sup> for defining the Self. One is a "Soul" only insofar as he tries to become one through God's will, doing His business in his own unique fashion, becoming one with the Absolute Self--a work finished only in eternity. It is an ideal, never a given fact.

Royce uses unity in the sense of a very close relationship, union, rather than continuous abstract identity. Matter for him is a kind of experience of one mind caused by another mind. The finite Self is the Knower, a human life unified by a plan.

Royce and Bowne both agree with Plato that there is no such thing as dead matter anywhere in the world. But for Plato, Matter is simply a shadow, a representation of the real; for Bowne it is an expression of God's will; for Royce it is a kind of experience in finite minds caused by the Absolute. The fundamental difference between them is not the nature of matter, but its purpose. For Plato it was a copy of the Pattern; it was made because God wanted to create order out of the primordial chaos. For Bowne and Royce it was that we might know God's will in our own experience.

For Royce Reality is the thought of the Absolute. For Bowne it is the Infinite Person. For Plato there were four kinds: God, or the Demiurge; the Pattern, or the Limit; the Receptacle, or the Unlimited; and fourth, the Creature. Bowne and Royce started with our own experience to find reality, as did Plato, but they chose different routes to reach it.

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<sup>61</sup> Royce, IPT, 273

<sup>62</sup> Royce, IPT, 274

<sup>63</sup> Royce, IPT, 275





They also had very different understanding of the facts of experience. For both Royce and Bowne, knowledge comes by way of experience, but it goes beyond any observable facts to understand the truth. For Plato, knowledge came through recollection of the ideal world we knew before our birth.

For Royce, one's Self is his consciousness viewed as having unity of meaning, and as exemplifying an ideal. For Bowne, it is simple the mental subject in any mental activity. For Plato, the Self is the soul, the mind, the part of man that is like God. For both Royce and Bowne the self is not a thing, but is an activity. For Plato too, although he had not clearly thought the problem through, we can also say that it was an activity; but he also thought of it as some special kind of substance.

In many ways we see that ideas of Plato were the springboard from which both Bowne and Royce started, and many of their conceptions are traceable to him in this field of human personality.

The third philosopher whose views on the subject of human personality have been studied in detail is John Laird. He feels that personality is one of the most interesting of studies.<sup>64</sup> So many things affect personality and are affected by it. We would be less than human if we never asked, "What is man? What is the soul?"<sup>65</sup> But few think out the answers, and until we have done so we are not philosophers.<sup>66</sup> These problems should be studied ahead of all others because all others depend on them. He finds the tendency used to be to explain the self in terms of something else--now we explain other things in terms of the self.

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1 Laird, PS, 1

2 Laird, PS, 2

3 Laird, PS, 2





The self has been called a transparent unity, to explain why, with certain metaphysical ideas as background, we cannot see <sup>67</sup>into it, but only through it. But no idealists believe this, or that the self presents no problems. Some say it must be ultimate, others say it cannot be. But the surest knowledge we have is of the self, because we are interested in it. Laird's hope is to advance the knowledge a little further.

Laird is the least idealistic of the four philosophers we have studied for this thesis. He says he is a realist, but his chief claim to belonging to the realistic school is his theory of knowledge, which is that the ob-<sup>68</sup>ject of our knowledge is independent of our knowing it. But this is also true of Bowne and even of Royce, if one means "all human selves" by "our." Further evidence will be advanced to show that he is not so far from the idealistic position as he would have us believe.

He finds that the self is more than a collection of experiences. Thus he opposes the familiar view of Hume, who holds that conscious experience consists of isolated states of feeling, related to each other in quite external fashion. Laird states in Chapter One of Problems of the Self,<sup>69</sup> that it is possible to say that these experiences unite in a self which has a quality of permanency to make them intelligible, to explain<sup>70</sup> their continuity. This continuing, personal self is a unity. Any ex-<sup>71</sup>perience forms part of a connected whole of experience, which may be of many kinds, and are themselves innumerable conscious processes. However, "the unity of consciousness cannot be merely the combination of com-<sup>72</sup>ponent processes." The act of comparison proves this; the unity in these<sup>73</sup> acts is the essence of the knowing self.

In Chapter IX, called "Unity and Continuity of the Self"<sup>74</sup> he points out that these are its most discoverable features. He develops this through

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67 Laird, PS, 4  
 68 Laird, SIR, 14  
 69 Laird, PS, 13-4  
 70 Laird, HCM, 228  
 71 Laird, PS, 194  
 72 Laird, PS, 202  
 73 Laird, PS, 203  
 74 Laird, PS, 213





three kinds of unity, that of cognition, of feeling, and of endeavor.<sup>75</sup> These unities are more intimate than any other sort discoverable in experience, but are not complete or balanced in many respects, insofar as we are able to observe them.<sup>76</sup> There are always gaps, disunities, lack of connection even in the most "normal" personality. Such continuity as is discoverable in thought and endeavor proves the unity of personality,<sup>77</sup> but we must not overestimate this to the extent of overlooking or neglecting the apparent disunion.<sup>78</sup> Personal unity involves personal identity, of which we feel assured by memory and our bodily sensations.<sup>79</sup> But introspection, Laird feels is not sufficient proof in a matter of this kind. It is the "common-sense" view that the brain is sufficient to account for the unity of mind, conscious and subconscious.<sup>80</sup> There is a unity with the self of the past, there can be no question about that.

This unity we are trying to define shows even through multiple personality.<sup>81</sup> This is not a new thing, but scientific study of it is. In the Old Testament we read of demoniac possession, and from time to time throughout all the ages people have been said to have "devils in them," or to be "beside themselves." Science has taught us not to be afraid of the phenomenon; but it is still mysterious. Even the Scientists do not thoroughly understand its cause. The difficulty seems to be that there is never complete dissociation,<sup>82</sup> although often there appears to be. The personality that appears is probably part of the original one,<sup>83</sup> which under normal conditions is relegated to the sub-conscious, and is thoroughly under control. In cases of so-called dissociation we see less apparent unity and continuity, that is all. The sum-total of the evidence

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75 Laird, PS, 213

76 Laird, PS, 215

77 Laird, PS, 217 & ff

78 Laird, PS, 236 & ff

79 Laird, PS, 246

80 Laird, PS, 251

81 Laird, PS, 272

82 Laird, PS, 273

83 Laird, PS, 275





seems to point to the conclusion, says Laird, that all the diversities and changes of personality are really not what they see, but that the personality is fundamentally one.

The main problems raised by Laird are: First, whether experience is a connected whole; and second, whether self is distinct from mind. The first he would answer affirmatively, as proved by memory and acts of comparison. The second answer would be negative, by his own definition, which is that for all practical purposes, person, soul, mind, consciousness and mentality, all mean the self, which is a continuous, unified whole.

Laird uses a much more introspective method for testing the unity and continuity of the self than that used by Plato. He studies feeling and endeavor, bodily sensations, and cognition, for material, and brings in memory and acts of comparison as proofs of this. Memory is not merely a function of the brain. Plato would agree with this. He finds memory a proof of immortality, (which has nothing to do with the brain) through the theory of reminiscence.

Unity, for Laird, is continuity, as for Plato; "with its roots in the consciousness of the past, it looks forward to the consciousness of the future,"<sup>84</sup> We find the unity of the self. The universe is held together in a unity which is the knowledge of the divine self.<sup>85</sup> This is definitely an idealistic conception, although the two, mind and world (or body) are not same. Bowne would have a similar reason for unity--identity of structure throughout. Royce is the only one of the philosophers who holds to a unity of self and body, and then only if we mean the Absolute Self. His unity here is one of purpose, developed from

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84 Laird, PS, 40

85 Laird, PS, 205





within through variety of expression.<sup>86</sup> If we speak of the finite self, the only unity even Royce would recognize is that of mind. For Laird there is a clear, close relationship between mental and bodily state, as for Plato, Bowne and Royce. The mind influences the body, and vice-versa. That is the only sort of unity of mind and body any of these men would recognize.

Our fourth and last modern philosopher is Edgar Sheffield Brightman, a follower of Bowne in the sense of being a personalist. His fundamental metaphysical background is much the same. For him personality is the irreducible, ultimate reality.<sup>87</sup> Everything which we call impersonal, including the very world of physical nature, is nothing but the experience or activity of personality. "All nature is the ongoing of the conscious activity of God."

For Brightman the body is not <sup>part</sup> of finite personality but its constant environment.<sup>88</sup> What we actually experience is our consciousness, with all its mingled variety and unity, necessity and freedom, sensation and reason, evil and values. "The person is the unitary experiencing of all these processes in one whole of consciousness."<sup>89</sup> But, he says, "we cannot think about personality intelligently without thinking about its relation to the body."<sup>90</sup> Each to a certain extent controls the other. Our personality is the first fact to be taken into consideration in deciding what body is.<sup>91</sup> The unity of personality, which is consciousness or mind, is taken for granted; all science and philosophy arises from trying to apply the same principle of unity to everything.

"No human being is fully personal,"<sup>92</sup> says Brightman, but we some-

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86 Royce, WI, I, 493-4

87 Brightman, IGAP, 4

88 Brightman, IGAP, 8

89 Brightman, IGAP, 9

90 Brightman, IGAP, 10

91 Brightman, IGAP, 12

92 Brightman, IGAP, 53





times have flashes of insight as to what it would be like. That ideal of perfection we use in thinking about God. He is perfection of conscious personality, the power that cannot be defeated.<sup>93</sup>

"The human soul is the seat of perception and knowledge, could we but know what it is . . . our knowledge of all truth would be far advanced. The theory of mind (psychology in its broadest sense) is the most fundamental part of philosophy."<sup>94</sup>

Brightman makes a distinction between a self and a personality. Self is a more general term. Anything that has consciousness is a self; but to be a personality one must be able, in addition, to achieve ends.<sup>95</sup> The characteristics of a minimum self are:<sup>96</sup>

1. Self-experience--no experiences float, but all belong to selves.
2. Qualia--distinguishable qualities of sense and feeling.
3. Time and Space--experienced by all.
4. Transcendence of time and space (unity.)
5. Process and conation.
6. Awareness of meaning.
7. Response to environment.
8. Privacy.

The characteristics of a person<sup>97</sup> (emergent traits of personality) are the same, with additions as follows:

1. Self-experience . . . (More complex and highly organized for past and future)
2. Qualia . . . . (New ones emerge obligation, taste, etc. which are imperative norms)
3. Time and Space . . . (Range extended)
4. Transcendence . . . (More complex field of attention and better memory)
5. Process . . . (Rises to new levels)
6. Awareness . . . . (Becomes conceptual thought and reasoning)
7. Response . . . . (Becomes social and ideal; more selective)
8. Privacy . . . . (Understood and respected)

The unity and identity of personality is necessary for spiritual development.

93 Brightman, IGAP, 56

94 Brightman, IP, 166

95 Brightman, POR, 346, 350

96 Brightman, POR, 351-2

97 Brightman, POR, 352-3





"I am responsible to myself for past purposes and contracts; yet if I am not the one who entertained those purposes and made those contracts, I experience neither responsibility nor continuous growth. Unless I am one person, identical through change, all hope for immortality becomes irrational . . . . Finally, if personality is not a true, identical unity it is absurd to regard God as a person, whether finite or infinite." (98)

The unity of personality, therefore, is the unity of consciousness, for Brightman. Personality includes consciousness only, and does not include any of its environment.<sup>99</sup>

In Brightman's paper, The Dialectical Unity of Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Religion, delivered at the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, he states as his position that "some sort of unity of consciousness is presupposed in all experience."<sup>100</sup> This means that the unity is immanent in the experience. "My present is connected with all my past."<sup>101</sup>

All four of the philosophers we have studied are idealists, with varying conceptions of self and personality. But all stem from Plato in the first instance, and have views which are, in a sense, outgrowths of his, though differing in many particulars. All agree that personality, or the self, is conscious experience, and that the nature of the not-me is akin to that of the me. The not-me is to be the servant of the me, and a subject of its knowledge. All believe in the immortality of the human personality, but differ in the particulars. Bowne and Brightman believe in immortality continuous with one's present experience. Plato and Royce also believe in survival after bodily death, but the conditions of life would be radically changed in the "hereafter."

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98 Brightman, PAR, 354

99 Brightman, PAR, 358

100 Brightman, DUC, 70

101 Brightman, DUC, 71





#### SECTION FOUR

From very early times, philosophers have been interested in studying the super-physical part of man. With life came consciousness, it is true. Animals have memories, and some of them have affection for their offspring. They can be taught certain rudimentary things. This is one step in the long, uphill climb of evolution. But humans have something more, that lets us appreciate the beauty of a lovely sunset, the innocence of a baby's face, or the majestic strength of a great cathedral, built by the hands and minds of other men, or the capable brain and expert fingers of a fine surgeon. None of these interest sub-humans, or have the slightest meaning for them. What constitutes this difference?

Is it the same part of us that knows things, they wondered, that remembers the experiences of yesterday or yesteryear, or of our childhood, and can evaluate them in the light of what we have learned since? Is it the same as the part that dreams when we are asleep or under anesthetic? These and many other questions of like nature have concerned philosophers of all ages.

Early thinkers found this thing that comes to the body with life the soul. It seemed to be akin to breath; and associated with it. It departed permanently with life, temporarily with consciousness from the body, and was never, in their experience, found apart from a body. What could it be? What was its nature?

Plato called it soul. He thought it was the most important part of a man, and spent much of his time evolving theories about it that fit in with the physical world as he knew it. The result was epoch-making for all philosophy, particularly for the idealists who came after him. He started them all off with a great deal of food for thought on this important subject.





The result of his meditations on the soul was a firm conviction that the soul was the part which did the thinking, the divine part of man. It dwelt in the body because it had fallen from the high, pure air of heaven where it had contemplated Eternal Ideas and the Idea of the Good, changeless and holy; and became attached to earth. Soul was a unity still, a complex unity, more often than not at odds with the body in which it was incarnate. The body was more or less of a nuisance to the Soul, dragging it away to things of sense, (which were not spiritual value) having to be fed and cared for, and constantly proving its limitations and weaknesses. But it had a certain kinship with Soul. There was something divine about Body and something of the creature about Soul, even though it was more like God than body. So the Soul tolerated it, and used it for spiritual and intellectual ends insofar as they could be accomplished that way.

But the philosopher thought a great deal about the advantages of being "disembodied," and "practically dying," that is, being out of the body while in it. The philosopher always dreamed of the day when his soul could again fly upward, untrammelled, into the world of Ideas whence it had come, and would return again, being immortal.

Had Plato been possessed of more scientific knowledge, he would have had different ideas about the creation of the soul. His myth of the Demiurge and the Receptacle is a far cry from our evolutionary view of the development of the universe. But he did see clearly that all the functions of the soul constituted a unity through complexity. He never heard of personality, but many philosophers have found his soul-conception a good substitute. The soul was also conceived by Plato as motion, activity, both in the form of the World-Soul and of the god-created finite souls. The soul had the power to move other things besides itself, and was the





only thing which had this power.

This belief in the soul as activity has been accepted by modern philosophers as well. It was also considered to be the link between God and the world, the channel through which He transmits His activity. It is always invisible, we can see only its manifestations in others, and experience consciousness in ourselves. Out of this invisible self, as it began now to be called, comes the meaning of everything. It is full conscious life. For Bowne this self or person was the "mental subject" without which thought, consciousness, and memory are impossible. He also postulated a closer relationship between the finite person and the Infinite Person. This relationship was mental as well as spiritual. The external world is an expression of God's will, a sort of divine language between the Infinite and the finite. The knowledge gained of the external world becomes material for self-knowledge and self-control, which are, for Bowne, true personality. This is never anything but incomplete and imperfect in a finite person; it finds perfection in oneness with the Infinite Person.

For Royce, the whole universe is part of God, and this includes finite persons. Yet there is a contrast-effect of the self-consciousness of finite souls against the rest of the universe. Self emerges to give continuity and meaning, and to exemplify an ideal. This finite self is also part of the Absolute Self, and God would not be complete without us. This is a further development of the idea of personality striving for oneness with God, with the inclusion of the notion that God needs us, which is new.

The idea of human personality seems to be gaining more spiritual content, more purpose, in the thought of these twentieth century idealistic philosophers. It is almost axiomatic with them that the self, the mind or





consciousness, is unified, and self-identical. This is taken for granted since we have memory, and are capable of purpose.

In the thought of the personalistic idealists Bowne and Brightman, we find the latest development of this idea of human personality. For them it is the ultimate reality, from which everything else arises, all philosophy and all science. From being a minor point, one of many worthy of consideration, it has become central. Personality is the first fact to be taken into consideration. It is the underlying conscious experience of an individual. The study of the working of mind has become the most fundamental part of philosophy.

Brightman's ultimate view of personality differs from Bowne's, however, in their views of its interpretation. For Bowne, as we have said, personality is self-control and self-knowledge, qualities of the self which never reach perfection in a finite person. For Brightman, personality is that part of the universe which is immediately present to us--a datum of all experience--underlying it and immanent in it. It is inherent in the universe. The facts point to a world beyond our personality, but of the same kind. It is the final authority because of the use of reason--by true persons, in whom alone it exists. The consummation of the perfect personality is growth toward a sharing of perfection, a love of one's fellowmen. This is the spiritual basis for all else we hold dear.

This study of some idealistic views of personality suggests the following tentative, admittedly idealistic, definition: Personality is that emergent quality of a self that enables him to have a finitely limited insight into what it would be like to have a share in the plans and purposes of the Supreme Person, God.

For this goal of personality only provisionally accepted, no claim of absolute truth is made. But if it offers inducement to further advance in the study of the problem, it will have been worth reaching.





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